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Summary 
This article describes different approaches in which courts have
determined the validity of customary marriages under the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act in order to address the historical injustices of
vulnerable parties in a customary marriage. These approaches are drawn
from selected cases decided after the Act came into effect and consist of
two scenarios, namely, ‘judicial notice’ and ‘proof’ of customary law.
These approaches produce considerably distinct results. On the one hand,
where courts adopt the approach of ‘judicial notice’ and apply official
customary law, the inevitable result has been the invalidation of
marriages. On the other hand, if the approach has emphasised the
recognition of the essence of customary law, courts have validated these
marriages and protected vulnerable parties. These results may support (at
least partly) the theory by various scholars that the Constitution
envisaged that courts will be applying living customary law in order to
fulfil their constitutional obligations. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the coming into effect of the Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act (RCMA),1 case law show that customary rules and
practices that regulate the validity of a customary marriage have
undergone significant change.2 The motivating factor has been the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution).3 For
example, courts have accepted the rule laid down in Mabena v
Letsoalo,4 namely, that a woman could now negotiate and receive
lobolo.5 In accepting this change, Judge Dlodlo in Fanti v Boto cited
with approval Mabena v Letsoalo and observed that ‘[i]f courts do not
observe the role played … by women in society, then that would
include failure … on their part to participate in the development of
customary law’.6 
In addition, courts have accepted the requirement that, under
Tsonga customary law, a husband who wants to marry a subsequent
wife must inform his first wife.7 This, again, was based on the fact that
‘any notion of the first wife’s equality with her husband would be
completely undermined if a husband were able to introduce a new
marriage partner to their domestic life without her consent’.8 More
recently, in Nhlapo v Mahlangu9 the court accepted evidence by
expert witnesses that according to Ndebele culture, ‘when a man
wants to enter into a second customary marriage he must have the
first wife’s approval’.10 In recognising this rule, the court made
1 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (RCMA), which regulates all
customary marriages in South Africa, came into effect on 15 November 2000.
2 See, eg, the cases of Mabuza v Mbatha 2003 (4) SA 218 (C) and Mayelane v
Ngwenyama 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC).
3 In particular, sec 39(2) of the Constitution provides that ‘[w]hen interpreting any
legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court,
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights’. In addition, sec 211(3) provides that ‘[c]ourts must apply customary law
when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that
specifically deals with customary law’. 
4 In Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 (2) SA 1068 (T), decided prior to the RCMA, the High
Court gave effect to the living custom that allows the mother of the bride to
perform the task of negotiating and receiving lobolo. Traditionally, this
requirement was met if the agreement was between the bride’s and groom’s male
guardians.
5 Fanti v Boto 2008 (5) SA 405 (C) para 21.
6 Fanti v Boto (n 5 above) para 21
7 According to expert witnesses’ evidence, the requirement was to ‘inform’ the wife
and her ‘consent’ was not needed. Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above) para 61.
8 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above) para 72. In addition, the Constitutional Court
in para 74 observed, ‘given that marriage is a highly personal contract, it would
be a blatant intrusion on the dignity of one partner to introduce a new member
to that union without obtaining that partner’s consent’.
9 [2015] ZAGPPHC 142 para 34. Briefly, the challenge to the validity of the
marriage was brought by the first wife who alleged that, according to Ndebele
custom, her consent as the first wife was a requirement for subsequent marriages
by her husband.
10 Nhlapo v Mahlangu (n 9 above) para 33.
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reference to the dictum in Mayelane v Ngwenyama and was of the
opinion that ‘consent of the first wife was a necessary dignity and
equality component of a further customary marriage in terms of
section 3(1)(b) of the Recognition Act’.11 
Against this brief background, the article explores whether courts
apply living or official customary law when establishing the validity of
customary marriages. The aim is to assess how courts address the
injustices of the past that led to the non-legal protection of vulnerable
parties, particularly women, in customary marriages. The article is
divided into five main sections. The second section briefly outlines the
legal framework regarding the requirements for a valid customary
marriage under the RCMA. This part also discusses the distinction
between living and official customary law. The third part is a
discussion of the two main approaches adopted by courts in
determining the validity of a customary marriage, namely, the ‘judicial
notice approach’ and ‘proof of customary law approach’. The fourth
section is a critical analysis of the cases discussed and addresses the
question whether courts protect vulnerable parties in a customary
marriage. The last section is a conclusion in which, borrowing from
Ozoemena’s words, it is argued that ‘the value of the Recognition Act
as a tool to remedy the injustices of the past in relation to customary
marriages’12 can be achieved when courts apply living customary law.
Such an approach may partly also support the theory by various
scholars that the Constitution envisaged that courts would be
applying living customary law in order to fulfil their constitutional
obligations.13 
11 Nhlapo v Mahlangu (n 9 above) paras 30 & 33 as cited in Mayelane v Ngwenyama
(n 2 above) para 30.
12 R Ozoemena ‘Legislation as a critical tool in addressing social change in South
Africa: Lessons from Mayelane v Ngwenyama’ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic
Law Journal 969 987.
13 TW Bennett ‘Reintroducing African customary law to the South African legal
system’ (2009) 57 American Journal of Comparative Law 1 11. Further, Bennett 8
observed that the ‘[c]onstitutional protection was reserved for the living law,
which was deemed a genuine feature of African culture’. See also W Lehnert ‘The
role of the courts in the conflict between African customary law and human rights’
(2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 241 247. Lehnert (247) observes
that ‘the courts’ obligation to apply customary law must refer to the living law
because the distorted official customary law cannot be regarded as an expression
of the culture of black South Africans’. See C Himonga & C Bosch ‘The application
of African customary law under the Constitution of South Africa: Problem solved
or just beginning?’ (2000) 117 South African Law Journal 306 331 where similar
observations were made. In addition, Himonga & Bosch 328 observed that ‘[i]n
the South African situation, the recognition of a right to culture also implies the
recognition of theoretical frameworks of law that lie outside the legal positivists
approaches to law. Denying that law can exist outside the state-generated law is
tantamount to denying that there is a right to culture.’ Reference can also be
made to C Himonga & A Pope ‘Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Minister for Home
Affairs: A reflection on wider implications’ (2013) Acta Juridica 318 321. 
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2 Requirements for a valid customary marriage under 
the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
The RCMA regulates all customary marriages in South Africa.14
According to section 2, it recognises two types of marriages, namely,
marriages concluded before and after the coming into effect of the
RCMA.15 Marriages concluded before the RCMA are recognised
provided they are in existence and valid at the time when the Act
came into force.16 With the exception of KwaZulu-Natal, the
requirements for a valid marriage concluded before the RCMA are,
therefore, provided under traditional living customary laws as
observed by indigenous communities.17 These requirements, as
outlined by several scholars,18 include the age of puberty or
undergoing initiation ceremonies; consent of spouses; consent of
parents or guardians, especially the bride’s male guardian or father;
prohibited degrees of relationships, whereby most communities
prohibited marriages between members of the same clan; formal
delivery or handing over of the woman from her family to the family
of the husband; the agreement that lobolo will be delivered; and non-
existence of a civil marriage. 
For customary marriages concluded in KwaZulu-Natal, the
requirements, as stipulated under section 38(1) of the KwaZulu Act on
the Code of Zulu Law and Natal Code of Zulu Law, are consent of the
father of the prospective wife (if a minor), which consent may not be
withheld without good reason; consent of the father of the
prospective husband (if a minor); and a public declaration by the
intended wife to an official witness at the celebration of the marriage
14 According to the Preamble, the RCMA is an ‘Act to make provision for the
recognition of customary marriages; to specify the requirements for a valid
customary marriage; to regulate the registration of customary marriages; to
provide for the equal status and capacity of spouses of such marriages; to regulate
the dissolution of customary marriages; to provide for the making of regulations;
to repeal certain provisions of certain laws; and to provide for matters connected
therewith’.
15 Sec 2(1) of the RCMA provides that ‘[a] marriage which is a valid marriage at
customary law and existing at the commencement of this Act is for all purposes
recognised as a marriage’. Sec 2(2) of the RCMA provides that ‘[a] customary
marriage entered into after the commencement of this Act, which complies with
the requirements of this Act, is for all purposes recognised as a marriage’. Sec 2(3)
provides that ‘[i]f a person is a spouse in more than one customary marriage, all
valid customary marriages entered into before the commencement of this Act are
for all purposes recognised as marriages’. Sec 2(4) provides that ‘[i]f a person is a
spouse in more than one customary marriage, all such marriages entered into
after the commencement of this Act, which comply with the provisions of this Act,
are for all purposes recognised as marriages’.
16 See also IP Maithufi ‘MM v MN’ (2012) 2 De Jure 405. 
17 See TW Bennett Customary law in South Africa (2004) 194.
18 Eg, Bennett (n 17 above) 195 and C Rautenbach et al Introduction to legal
pluralism (2010) 50.
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that the union was with her free will and consent.19 After the RCMA
came into effect, section 3(1) requires that both parties must be over
the age of 18;20 both parties must give consent to be married under
customary law;21 and, more relevant to this discussion, ‘the marriage
must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance with
customary law’.22 
From the preceding paragraphs, whether a customary marriage
was concluded before or after the RCMA, one of the crucial
requirements for its validity is meeting the customary law
requirements. But what is customary law in the context of customary
marriage requirements? According to the RCMA, customary law is
defined as ‘the customs and usages traditionally observed among the
indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of the
culture of those peoples’.23 Literature informs us that there are mainly
two forms of customary law: living and official law.24 These forms
have been confirmed in, for instance, Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha,25
in which case the Constitutional Court stated: ‘the official rules of
customary law are sometimes contrasted with what is referred to as
living customary law, which is an acknowledgment of the rules that
are adapted to fit in with changed circumstances.’26 Again, in Mabena
v Letsoalo, the High Court held that there are two forms of customary
law, ‘an official version as documented by writers, and living law,
denoting law actually observed by African communities’.27 In
addition, legislation dealing with customary law also recognises the
coexistence of official and living customary law. For example, both the
RCMA and Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of
Related Matters Act of 2009 (Customary Succession Act) define
customary law as ‘the customs and usages traditionally observed
among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form
part of the culture of those peoples’.28 
19 Sec 38(1) of the KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985 and Natal
Code of Zulu Law published in Proclamation R151 of 1987, GG 10966.
20 Sec 3(1)(a)(i) RCMA.
21 Sec 3(1)(a)(ii) RCMA.
22 Sec 3(1)(b) RCMA.
23 Sec 1 RCMA.
24 Authors, eg, C Himonga et al (eds) African customary law in South Africa: Post-
apartheid and living law perspectives (2014) 27 have observed a third form of
customary law which is state generated by courts and legislation. On the general
discussion on dichotomy between official and living customary law, see generally
Himonga & Bosch (n 13 above) 319-331. 
25 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC).
26 Bhe (n 25 above) para 87.
27 Mabena v Letsoalo (n 4 above) para 1074.
28 See secs 1 of both the RCMA and the Customary Succession Act. It should,
however, be observed that, even though both legislations use the exact same
wording in defining customary law, there is a minor difference between the two.
The RCMA use the word ‘peoples’ and the Customary Succession Act use ‘people’.
The difference, however, does not affect the fact that both legislations envisage
the living customary law as observed by the indigenous communities. See also
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In addition, when determining the applicable customary law in the
context of customary marriage requirements, it is important to restate
that these laws are diverse due to the different ethnic groups that
exist in South Africa.29 This diversity, compounded by the different
forms and sources of customary law,30 gives rise to the need to
ascertain the applicable customary laws in a given case, which
remains a challenge.31 Furthermore, our courts have observed that
‘customary law is a dynamic system of law that, along with society,
changes with time’.32 This position has led courts to emphasise the
importance of proving the custom in the context of customary
marriages. In Moropane v Southon,33 for example, the court
observed:34
African law and its customs are not static but dynamic. They develop and
change along with the society in which they are practiced. This capacity to
change requires the court to investigate the customs, cultures, rituals and
usages of a particular ethnic group to determine whether their marriage
was negotiated and concluded in terms of their customary law at a
particular time of their evolution. 
Again, in Mayelane, the Constitutional Court observed:35
First, a court is obliged to satisfy itself, as a matter of law, on the content of
customary law, and its task in this regard may be an onerous where the
customary law rule at stake is a matter of controversy with the
constitutional recognition of customary law, this has become the
responsibility of the courts. It is incumbent on our courts to take steps to
satisfy themselves as to the content of customary law and, where
necessary, to evaluate local custom in order to ascertain the content of the
relevant legal rule. 
The above discussion show that the Constitution envisaged that
courts will be applying living customary law. 
28 definitions by different customary law scholars, eg Rautenbach et al (n 18 above)
29 define living law ‘as original customs and usages that are in constant
development’. Himonga et al (n 24 above) 27 refer to Hamnett’s description of
customary law ‘as a set of norms which the actors in a social situation abstract
from practice and which they invest with binding authority’. Bennett (n 17 above)
1 indicates that ‘customary law is derived from social practices that the
community concerned accepts as obligatory’.
29 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above) para 51. See also Himonga & Pope (n 13
above) 322.
30 The different sources of customary law may include customs and usages of the
communities, case law and legislation.
31 See also recently observed by Ozoemena (n 12 above) 977 and Lehnert (n 13
above) 246.
32 See, eg, Bhe (n 25 above) para 87; Alexkor v Richtersveld Community 2004 (5) SA
460 (CC) para 52.
33 (755/12) [2014] ZASCA 76.
34 Moropane v Southon (n 33 above) para 36.
35 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above) para 48.
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3 Approaches of courts in determining the validity of 
a customary marriage
3.1 Judicial notice approach
The starting point for a discussion on whether courts apply official or
living customary law in determining the validity of a customary
marriage is section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act
(LEAA).36 The LEAA provides that ‘any court may take judicial notice
… of indigenous law in so far as such law can be ascertained readily
and with sufficient certainty …’37 Several authors agree that this
provision envisaged that courts will be applying ‘official customary
law’ since it is more certain than living customary law.38 For example,
Kruuse and Sloth-Nielsen have pointed out that ‘the application of
section 1 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act is possible only
where the customary law is reasonable and certain’.39 In addition,
courts have observed that ‘ascertaining customary law from textbooks
and case law does not present problems’.40 Indeed, Ngcobo J in his
dissenting judgment in Bhe affirmed that41
there are at least three ways in which indigenous law may be established.
In the first place, a court may take judicial notice of it. This can only
happen where it can readily be ascertained with sufficient certainty.
Section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 says so.
However, in ascertaining the applicable customary laws, section 39(2)
of the Constitution, which obligates courts to recognise and apply
customary law subject to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights,
becomes relevant.42 As Bennett rightly pointed out, acceptance of
customary law by courts ‘involved complex issues of proof,
compliance with the Constitution, and the endorsement of culture
and tradition’.43 In the context of customary marriage laws, the
36 Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, as amended by the Justice Laws
Rationalisation Act 18 of 1996.
37 Sec 1(1) LEAA. See also Himonga & Bosch (n 13 above) 308.
38 See, eg, Himonga & Pope (n 13 above) 323; H Kruuse & J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Sailing
between Scylla and Charybdis: Mayelane v Ngwenyama’ (2014) 17 Potchefstroom
Electronic Law Journal 1710 1718.
39 Kruuse & Sloth-Nielsen (n 38 above) 1718. See also Himonga & Bosch (n 13
above) 336 who observed that this provision does not help with proof of
customary law.
40 Motsoatsoa v Roro [2011] 2 All SA 324 para 15.
41 Bhe (n 25 above) para 150.
42 The importance of these provisions in the context of customary law has been
widely observed. See eg Ozoemena (n 12 above) 981; Himonga & Pope (n 13
above) 323; and C Rautenbach & W du Plessis ‘African customary marriages in
South Africa and the intricacies of a mixed legal system: Judicial (in)novatio or
confusio?’ (2012) 57 McGill Law Journal 749.
43 Bennett (n 13 above) 1.
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Constitutional Court in Mayelane v Ngwenyama reaffirmed this fact as
follows:44
When section 3(1)(b) thus speaks of customary law marriages, it necessarily
speaks of marriages in accordance with human dignity and fundamental
equality rights upon which our Constitution is based. It is no answer to
state that the definition of customary law and customary marriages in the
RCMA does not expressly state this. Those definitions must be read
together with the Constitution and this Court’s jurisprudence.
An examination of the cases in which the validity of a customary
marriage was challenged due to non-compliance with the formal
integration of a customary rule seems to suggest that courts comply
with section 1(1) of the LEAA, but disregards the Constitution. A
prime example is Fanti v Boto.45 The issue in this case was the validity
of a customary marriage where there was non-fulfilment of the
requirement of formal delivery of the bride to the bridegroom’s
family. What was at stake was the husband’s right to bury his
deceased wife.46 The brief facts were that the first respondent’s
daughter passed away in Hermanus on 7 November 2007. Funeral
arrangements were made to bury the deceased in Hermanus, where
she was staying with the first respondent (her mother) at the time of
her death.47 A day before the funeral date, the applicant sought an
urgent application for an order declaring that he was entitled to the
custody and control of his wife’s body, and to determine when and
where his deceased wife was to be buried.48 
The applicant’s founding affidavit deposed that he was married to
the deceased according to Xhosa customary marriage laws in 2005.
He further averred that in the conclusion of this marriage, he met the
Xhosa customary marriage laws, including payment of lobolo in the
amount of R3 000, and two bottles of brandy were delivered to the
first respondent.49 The first respondent denied the fact that a valid
marriage had taken place. She asserted that the initial payment was
not lobolo but imvula mlomo (the mouth-opener), the acceptance by
the bride’s family, which only signifies willingness to enter into the
marriage negotiation.50 The court analysed the wording of the RCMA
and held that no valid marriage existed between the deceased and
the applicant.51 The result was that the mother of the deceased was
44 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above) para 76. In addition, the Constitutional Court
approved the authority laid down in Gumede as follows: ‘This Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act not only makes provision for regulation of customary
marriages, but most importantly, it seeks to jettison gendered inequality within
the marriage and the marital power of the husband by providing for the equal
status and capacity of spouses’ (para 77).
45 Fanti v Boto (n 5 above).
46 Fanti v Boto para 1.
47 As above.
48 Fanti v Boto (n 5 above) para 2.
49 Fanti v Boto para 5.
50 Fanti v Boto para 8.
51 Fanti v Boto para 19.
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declared the person entitled to undertake funeral arrangements and
to bury the deceased daughter.52 
For purposes of the article, however, what is relevant is that in
holding that no marriage existed, the judge cited with approval the
essential requirements of a customary marriage as consent of the
bride, consent of the bride’s father or guardian, payment of lobolo,
and the handing over of the bride, as laid down in Mabuza v Mbatha
and other case law.53 The judge also made reference to scholarly
writings on these requirements.54 
Commenting on the importance of the requirement of the handing
over of the bride in validating a customary marriage, the court
observed:55
One does not merely inform the head of the family of the bride. The
customary marriage must take place in his presence and/or the presence of
those representing his family and who have been duly authorised to do so
… The importance of these rituals and ceremonies is that they indicate in a
rather concretely visible way that a customary marriage is being contracted
and that lobolo has been paid and/or the arrangement regarding the
payment of lobolo have been made and that such arrangements are
acceptable to the two families, particularly the bride’s family.
Similarly, in Motsoatsoa v Roro,56 ‘the contention was that one of the
crucial prerequisites of a valid customary marriage, namely, the
handing over of the bride to the bridegroom’s family, is amiss’.57
What was at stake was the right to inherit the deceased’s house.58 The
facts of the case are briefly that the applicant and the deceased were
lovers and lived together in the same house from 2005 until his death
in 2009. Before his death, the deceased introduced the applicant to
his parents and informed them of his intention to marry her.59
Thereafter the deceased, through his parents, negotiated and agreed
on lobolo with the applicant’s parents.60 After his death, the applicant
approached the Department of Home Affairs, the third respondent,
with a request to have the customary marriage between herself and
52 Fanti v Boto para 29.
53 Fanti v Boto paras 19 & 20. The court made reference to Mabuza v Mbatha (n 2
above) and other authorities, including Gidya v Yingwana 1944 NAC (N&T) 4;
R v Mane 1947 2 PH H 328 (GW); Ziwande v Sibeko 1948 NAC (C) 21; Ngcongolo v
Parkies 1953 NAC (S) 103.
54 Fanti v Boto (n 5 above) paras 20, 22 & 23. Reference was made to the writings of
JC Bekker & NJJ Olivier Indigenous law (1995) as well as JC Bekker Customary law in
Southern Africa (1989).
55 Fanti v Boto (n 5 above) paras 21, 22 & 23. The court further commented that ‘all
authorities are in agreement that a valid customary marriage only comes about
when the girl (in this case the deceased) has been formerly transferred or handed
over to her husband or his family’.
56 Motsoatsoa v Roro (n 40 above). 
57 Motsoatsoa v Roro para 7.
58 Motsoatsoa v Roro para 2.
59 As above.
60 Motsoatsoa v Roro para 3.
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the deceased registered posthumously.61 She did not succeed. The
applicant then approached the Court on two grounds: that it be
declared that a customary marriage had existed between herself and
the deceased; and that the Department of Home Affairs be directed to
register the customary marriage between the applicant and the
deceased in terms of section 4(7) of the RCMA.62 
The court, relying on the official customary laws and the academic
views of Maithufi and Bekker, Fanti v Boto, and Bennett,63 ruled that
no valid marriage existed due to non-compliance with the
requirement of the formal delivery of a customary marriage.64 Judge
Matlapeng, concluding that no valid marriage existed, observed:65
One of the crucial elements of a customary marriage is the handing over of
the bride by her family to her new family, namely, that of the groom …
Until the bride has been formally and officially handed over to the groom’s
people there can be no valid customary marriage. 
A more recent example where the challenge to the validity of a
customary marriage was based on the requirement of the handing
over of the bride to the bridegroom’s family is Mxiki v Mbata &
Another.66 What was at stake in this matter was the right to inherit
from the deceased estate.67 The case was an appeal from the court a
quo in which the trial judge had directed and ordered, first, that the
Department of Home Affairs register a customary marriage between
the deceased and the appellant concluded on 3 November 2007 and,
second, issue the appellant a customary marriage certificate.68 The
appellant alleged that she had entered a customary marriage with the
deceased in 2007 and that they were staying together until his death
in February 2009. She further alleged that a minor child had been
born out of this relationship and that they were also the registered
owners of two immovable properties.69 In support of these
allegations, the appellant annexed to her founding affidavit a copy of
an acknowledgment of receipt of partial delivery of the lobolo.70 The
deceased’s father disagreed with the appellant and stated that the
November 2007 events did not constitute a customary marriage
agreement, as ‘the appellant was never handed over to the deceased’s
family as required by customary law’.71 In agreeing with the
61 Motsoatsoa v Roro para 4.
62 Motsoatsoa v Roro para 1.
63 Motsoatsoa v Roro para 20.
64 Motsoatsoa v Roro para 22.
65 Motsoatsoa v Roro paras 19 & 20.
66 [2014] ZAGPPHC 825.
67 Mxiki v Mbata (n 66 above) para 2.
68 Mxiki v Mbata para 1.
69 Mxiki v Mbata para 2.
70 Mxiki v Mbata para 3.
71 Mxiki v Mbata para 4. 
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deceased’s father and holding that no valid marriage had taken place,
the judge stated:72
The Act requires that the marriage must be negotiated and entered into or
celebrated in accordance with customary law. The customary law of marriage
is, in my view, correctly stated by Matlapeng AJ in Motsoatso v Roro
& Another 2011 (2) ALL SA 324 at para 17 as follows: ‘As described by the
authors Maithufi IP and Bekker JC “Recognition of Customary Marriages
Act 1998 and its impact on family law in South Africa” CILSA 182 (2002) a
customary marriage in true African tradition is not an event but a process
that comprises a chain of events. Furthermore it is not about the bride and
groom. It involves the two families. The basic formalities which lead to a
customary marriage are: Emissaries are sent by the man’s family to the
woman’s family to indicate interest in the possible marriage (this of course
presupposes that the two parties ie the man and the woman have agreed
to marry each other); a meeting of the parties’ relatives will be convened
where lobolo is negotiated and the negotiated lobolo or part thereof is
handed over to the woman’s family and the two families will agree on the
formalities and date on which the woman will then be handed over to the
man’s family which handing over may include but not necessarily be
accompanied by celebration (wedding).
Further, the court was of the following opinion:73
A customary marriage is a union of two family groups a bride cannot hand
herself over to her in-laws. Her family has to hand the bride over to her
husband’s family at his family’s residence where the elders will counsel the
bride and the bridegroom in the presence of their respective families.
Accordingly, the court was of the view, it is the handing over of the bride,
even if the lobolo has not been paid in full, that constitute a valid
customary marriage not the payment of lobolo as the court a quo found. 
Consequently, similar to Fanti v Boto and Motsoatsoa v Roro, the court
concluded that ‘there can be no valid customary marriage until the
bride has been formally and officially handed over to her husband’s
family’.74 In holding that no valid marriage exists, the court relied on
the official customary law provided in Motsoatsoa v Roro and Bennett’s
writings.75 
Furthermore, in Ndlovu v Mokoena,76 the question before the court
was whether the lobolo transaction concluded the marriage between
the deceased and Ndlovu. The brief facts were that Ndlovu made an
application claiming that she was the only customary wife of the
deceased and requested an order declaring the (alleged) customary
marriage between Mokoena and the deceased null and void. The
deceased had passed away in 2008.77 As an educator in the service of
the Ministry of Education, pension benefits were payable to the wife
of the deceased. If the first alleged customary marriage had been
validly concluded, the pension was to be divided in half between the
72 Mxiki v Mbata para 9.
73 Mxiki v Mbata para 10.
74 As above.
75 Mxiki v Mbata (n 66 above) paras 9, 10 & 11. 
76 (2973/09) [2009] ZAGPPHC 29.
77 Ndlovu v Mokoena (n 76 above) para 2.
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two wives.78 Before the court there were two customary marriage
certificates issued by the Department of Home Affairs. The first was
that of Mokoena and the deceased, dated 25 May 1991. The second
was that of Ndlovu and the deceased, dated 20 May 1998. The same
marriage officer issued both certificates after the death of the
deceased. The marriage officer who issued the marriage certificates
told the court that he, inter alia, had reference to a one-page lobolo
negotiation document before he issued the marriage certificate.79 
The question that was before the court was whether the lobolo
transaction concluded the marriage between the deceased and
Ndlovu. The court referred with approval to the authority laid down in
the cases of Fanti v Boto and Mabena v Letsoalo, where it was held that
the lobolo transaction is but one of the two requirements for the
conclusion of a customary marriage. The other requirement is the
delivery of the woman to the family of the man. Judge Van Rooyen
consequently held:80
I have come to the conclusion that there are sufficient reasons for me to
intervene: there is no evidence that there was a delivery of Velaphi or that
they lived together and the court documents amount to supporting
evidence that a marriage had not been concluded. I, accordingly, find that
although there was no evidence of fraud, the marriage officer did not apply
his mind properly to all the facts which were before this Court and that the
certificate must be set aside. 
3.2 Proof of customary law
The second approach in determining the validity of a customary
marriage is to call witnesses to prove the existence of a particular
custom. This is in line with section 1(2) of LEAA. Section 1(2) of LEAA
provides that ‘[t]he provisions of subsection (1) shall not preclude any
part from adducing evidence of the substance of a legal rule
contemplated in that subsection which is in issue at the proceedings
concerned’. 
This provision, it is argued, envisages that courts will source living
customary rules from the experts of the community concerned. There
are several cases in which courts have adopted this approach and
called witnesses. In Mabuza v Mbatha,81 for example, the issue before
the court was the requirements for a valid siSwati customary
marriage.82 The brief facts were that the plaintiff and the defendant
entered into a relationship in 1989. The plaintiff fell pregnant in
September 1989. In or about November 1989 the defendant’s family
approached the plaintiff’s family to start negotiations for the lobolo
payments, and the penalty payment related to the fact that the
plaintiff had fallen pregnant out of wedlock. An agreement was
78 Ndlovu v Mokoena paras 1 & 2.
79 Ndlovu v Mokoena para 7.
80 Ndlovu v Mokoena para 12.
81 Mabuza v Mbatha (n 2 above). 
82 Mabuza v Mbatha para 3.
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reached with regard to the payment of lobolo, which the defendant
paid in full. The plaintiff and defendant lived together as husband and
wife since about 1992 when the plaintiff moved into the house with
the defendant. 83
In 2000, and after the parties had relocated to the Western Cape,
the relationship between them terminated and the plaintiff instituted
a divorce action against the defendant.84 The defendant opposed the
divorce action on the ground that no marriage existed between the
parties because under isiSwazi law, marriage required the payment of
lobolo and the formal handing over of the bride.85 The plaintiff herself
and an expert witness supplied evidence to the fact that a valid
marriage existed. The plaintiff’s evidence was that there were three
requirements to a siSwati marriage: lobolo; ukumekeza (formal
integration); and formal delivery of the woman to her husband’s
family. She told the court that all the requirements had been met
except for the ukumekeza custom. The expert witness’s evidence was
that if the lobolo requirement and formal delivery took place, the
formal integration could be waived.86 In addition, the expert witness
concluded ‘that it was inconceivable that ukumekeza was so vital such
that it could not be dispensed with by agreement between the
parties’.87 
The evidence of the defendant and his expert witness was that
ukumekeza was still a vital requirement. In particular, the expert
witness stated:88
Ukumekeza is vital because it makes a woman a wife. If a bride did not go
through ukumekeza, she would be no more than a girlfriend even if ilobolo
[were] paid for her. Ilobolo does not change the status of a woman to that
of a wife. It is only the ukumekeza custom, according to Swati people,
which makes a woman a wife.
The court acknowledged that this customary requirement existed, but
held that the omission was not fatal and the marriage was recognised
as valid.89 In upholding the marriage as valid, Judge Hlope said that
‘[i]n my judgment there is no doubt that ukumekeza, like so many
other customs, has somehow evolved so much so that it is probably
practised differently than it was centuries ago …’90 More importantly,
the court declared that ‘[i]f one accepts that African customary law is
recognized in terms of the Constitution … there is no reason … why
the courts should be slow at developing African customary law’.91 
83 Mabuza v Mbatha para 7.
84 Mabuza v Mbatha para 1.
85 Mabuza v Mbatha para 2.
86 Mabuza v Mbatha para 14.
87 Mabuza v Mbatha para 15.
88 Mabuza v Mbatha para 21.
89 Mabuza v Mbatha para 27.
90 Mabuza v Mbatha paras 25-27 (my emphasis).
91 Mabuza v Mbatha para 30 (my emphasis).
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Another example where proof of a particular customary rule by
witnesses led to the validity of a marriage is the case of Nthejane v
Road Accident Fund.92 In this case, the plaintiff, acting on behalf of her
minor son, sued the defendant for certain damages arising out of the
death of her husband, the biological father of her son.93 The brief
facts of this case were that the parties agreed to enter into lobolo
negotiations. These negotiations took place, and it was agreed that
the deceased’s family would give ten cows as lobolo. The parties also
agreed that delivery of the lobolo was to take place at a later stage.94
The defendant, however, challenged the validity of a customary union
due to non-fulfilment of the lobolo requirement.95 The issue for the
court to decide was whether or not the plaintiff was married to the
deceased in terms of a customary law. The plaintiff and her
grandfather gave evidence that the requirements of lobolo and formal
delivery of the woman had been met. The defence did not challenge
this. In holding that the marriage was valid, the court simply observed
‘that the lobolo agreement was acceptable to both families and that,
therefore, the arrangement was in accordance with their customary
practices’.96
In addition to these cases, in Mayelane v Ngwenyama97 the
appellant challenged the validity of the marriage between her
deceased husband and the respondent due to the fact that she, as the
first wife to the deceased, had not been consulted before the marriage
was concluded. The brief facts of the case are as follows: On 1 January
1984, the first respondent, Ms Mdjadi Florah Mayelane, was married
to the deceased, Hlengani Dyson Moyana, according to customary
law and tradition at Nkovani Village, Limpopo. Three children were
born out of the union. The marriage was not registered. The deceased
died on 28 February 2009 and the marriage was still subsisting. When
the first respondent sought to register the customary union at the
Department of Home Affairs after the death of the deceased, she was
advised that the appellant, Ms Mphephu Maria Ngwenyama, had also
sought to register a customary marriage allegedly contracted between
her and the deceased on 26 January 2008.98 
The first respondent challenged that the purported marriage
between the deceased and the appellant was ab initio null and void
because of the fact that she had not been consulted before it was
concluded. The Constitutional Court complied with both sections 1(1)
and (2) of the LEAA and called nine witnesses.99 In taking into
92 (2011) ZAFSHC 196.
93 Nthejane v Road Accident Fund (n 92 above) para 1.
94 Nthejane v Road Accident Fund para 9.
95 Nthejane v Road Accident Fund para 8.
96 Nthejane v Road Accident Fund paras 9 & 11.
97 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above).
98 Mayelane v Ngwenyama para 4.
99 The composition of these witnesses was as follows: three in subsisting polygynous
marriages; one advisor to the traditional leaders; one commissioner in the
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account their evidence, the court found that the living law of Xitsonga
required that the first wife be informed of her husband’s impending
subsequent marriages. Consequently, the Court invalidated the
subsequent marriage on the basis that consent from the first wife had
not been obtained.100 The Court arrived at this decision by, inter alia,
applying the constitutional principles of equality and dignity as they
relate to the first wife and the husband.101 As rightly pointed out by
Kruuse and Sloth-Nielsen, the view of the Constitutional Court was
that ‘informing’ and ‘consent’ were traditionally-accepted legal norms
upon which a valid marriage could exist.102 In this case, however, a
different conclusion was reached despite the fact that courts adopted
the same approach as in Mabuza and Nthenjane. 103
The last example is Moropane v Southon.104 The issue before the
court was whether the parties were married according to customary
law or civil law. This case was an appeal from the High Court in which
the trial judge had held that there was a valid customary marriage
between the appellant and the respondent. The brief facts of this case
were that Moropane (the appellant) and Southon (the respondent)
met and fell in love in 1995. At the time, Moropane was still married
to his former wife whom he divorced in 2000.105 In 2002, Moropane
proposed marriage to Southon. According to Southon and her
witnesses, she concluded a customary marriage because the lobolo
and formal delivery of the bride to her husband’s family, among other
requirements, had been met.106 Moropane disputed the fact that a
valid customary union had come into existence. According to him, the
so-called lobolo paid by his emissary was, just as in Fanti v Boto, for
pula molom/go kokota (literally translated as ‘opening the mouth to
start the marriage negotiations’). Moropane also admitted that
Southon, accompanied by her aunt, had come to his home, but
maintained that she was delivered not as a makoti.107 
Two expert witnesses were led to assist the court in determining
whether the marriage between the parties met Pedi customary
marriage requirements.108 Both experts agreed that the customary
marriage requirements for a valid customary marriage amongst the
Bapedi people included negotiations; agreement; the payment of
lobolo; and formal delivery of the woman, among others. More
importantly, both experts agreed that the handing over of the makoti
99 Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims; two traditional
leaders; and two academic experts.
100 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above) para 87. Apart from non-fulfilment of this
requirement, lobolo and other customary requirements were also not met.
101 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above) para 83.
102 Kruuse & Sloth-Nielsen (n 38 above) 1721.
103 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above) para 4.
104 Moropane v Southon (n 33 above) 76.
105 Moropane v Southon para 4.
106 Moropane v Southon paras 7-14.
107 Moropane v Southon paras14-15.
108 Moropane v Southon para 39.
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to her in-laws was the most crucial part of the customary marriage.109
The court found that the essential requirements for a valid customary
marriage according to the Bapedi people had been met and,
therefore, upheld the decision of the court a quo that a valid
customary marriage existed.110
4 Critical analysis: Are courts applying living or official 
customary law?
In determining the validity of customary marriages, three main
observations are made. First, courts seem to apply a new form of
customary law, which is not based on official or living customary law.
Second, courts are seen to strictly adhere to official customary law as
found in the books and case law. Lastly, courts accommodate and
recognise particular living customary rules as practised on the ground.
The impact of these approaches on the validity of customary
marriages and the protection of women found in these marriages is
discussed below.
4.1 New form of customary law
An examination of the cases discussed reveals that, in some instances,
courts do not apply ‘living’ customary law or ‘official’ customary law
when determining the validity of customary marriages.111 The
preference has been to apply a new form of customary law that is
either justified on the ‘development of customary law’, or on the
‘equality of spouses in a customary marriage’ envisaged by section 6
of the RCMA, read with section 9 of the Constitution.112 This position
has led Kruuse and Sloth-Nielsen to observe that ‘courts have had to
enter the law-making arena … where current environment … provides
inadequate direction’.113 
For example, in Mabuza v Mbatha, two expert witnesses gave
contradictory views on whether the requirement of the formal
integration of the woman may be waived or not. Judge Hlope
concluded that a valid customary marriage existed based on the fact
that ‘if one accepts that African customary law is recognised in terms
109 Moropane v Southon para 40.
110 Moropane v Southon paras 55-57.
111 See also similar observations by Bennett (n 13 above) 11 and Himonga & Pope
(n 13 above) 329.
112 Sec 6 of the RCMA provides: ‘A wife in a customary marriage has, on the basis of
the equality with her husband and subject to the matrimonial property system
governing the marriage, full status to acquire and dispose of property …’
113 Kruuse and Sloth-Nielsen (n 38 above) 1731. See also Bennett (n 13 above) 2 who
observed, in 2009, that once living law becomes a primary source of law, ‘the
courts start playing the role of law-makers’.
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of the Constitution … there is no reason, in my view, why courts
should be slow at developing African customary law’.114 Similarly, in
Mayelane v Ngwenyama, where evidence tendered by witnesses made
it clear to the court that the requirement was to ‘inform’ the first wife,
in the following terms:115
(a) although not the general practice any longer, VaTsonga men have a
choice whether to enter into further customary marriages; (b) when
VaTsonga men decide to do so they must inform their first wife of their
intention; (c) it is expected of the first wife to agree and assist in the
ensuing process leading to a further marriage; (d) if she does so, harmony
is promoted between all concerned; (e) if she refuses consent, attempts are
made to persuade her otherwise; (f) if that is unsuccessful, the respective
families are called to play a role in resolving the problem; (g) this resolution
process may result in divorce; and finally, (h) if the first wife is not informed
of the impending marriage, the second union will not be recognised, but
children of the second union will not be prejudiced by this as they will still
be regarded as legitimate children.
The Constitutional Court, however, developed Xitsonga customary
marriage rule of inform to make consent a requirement for a
subsequent marriage.116 
4.2 Living customary law
The Constitutional Court in Alexkor v Richtersveld Community observed
that ‘[i]t is important to note that indigenous law is not a fixed body
of formally classified and easily ascertainable rules’.117 In the context
of this discussion, where courts apply living customary law, courts
have accepted that it complies with constitutional requirements and
therefore the general outcome has been validation of that the
marriage. This outcome resonates with the observations made by
Lehnert and Bennett in 2005 and 2009, respectively, that courts
assumed that living customary law was more likely to comply with
constitutional values, particularly the right to equality and dignity.118
For example, courts seem to accept validity of a particular living
114 Mabuza v Mbata (n 2 above) para 30.
115 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above) paras 61 & 122. See also evidence of
Headman Maluleke in an additional affidavit where it is stated: ‘The prospective
bridegroom should inform his existing wife about his intentions to marry another
wife. He informs her so that she should not be surprised in seeing another wife. It
is not a requirement to even advise as to the identity of the prospective
subsequent wife. Whether she gives her consent or not, the prospective
bridegroom will proceed with his plan to marry another wife.’
116 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above) para 75. See also discussion by Ozoemena
(n 12 above) 979.
117 Alexkor v Richtersveld Community (n 32 above) para 52. See also Himonga & Pope
(n 13 above) 321 and Bennett (n 13 above) 11 who, however, observed that the
first acceptance of living customary law was in Ex Parte Chairperson of the
Constitution Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996, 1996
(4) SA 744 para 197 where the Constitutional Court held that the Constitution
guarantees ‘the survival of an evolving customary law’.
118 Lehnert (n 13 above) 247 and Bennett (n 13 above) 8-9. The rights to equality
and dignity are provided for in secs 9 and 10 of the Constitution, respectively. 
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customary rule where expert witnesses are called to give evidence
despite differences in their opinions. The courts simply believe the one
and disregard the other opinions. For example, in Moropane v
Southon, the court accepted evidence by expert witnesses on the Pedi
marriage requirements and upheld the decision of the court a quo
that a valid marriage existed despite the differences in the evidence
given.119 The differences in the evidence given by the expert
witnesses related to whether money could be used as lobolo, and
whether it was in accordance with Pedi culture to slaughter a sheep
instead of a cow, among others.120 
In some instances, courts seem to accept living customary law,
even where parties before the courts give the only evidence on the
applicable living customary law. The only qualification seems that the
other party must not have opposed it. For example, in Nthenjane, the
court accepted the evidence that lobolo and formal integration
requirements had been met. In this case, evidence was given by the
plaintiff and her grandfather and was not opposed by the
defendant.121 
Furthermore, and more important to the characteristics of
customary law, in the application of living customary law, courts seem
to pay regard to the fact that customary law is dynamic and changes
with social circumstances.122 This position is well summarised by the
Constitutional Court in Bhe, as follows:123 
True customary law will be that which recognises and acknowledges the
changes which continually take place. In this respect, I agree with Bennett’s
observation that ‘[a] critical issue in any constitutional litigation about
customary law will therefore be the question whether a particular rule is a
mythical stereotype, which has become ossified in the official code, or
whether it continues to enjoy social currency’. 
4.3 Official customary law
Where courts apply official customary law, the inevitable result has
been the invalidation of marriages. The discussion has also revealed
that issues raised in challenging the validity of marriages are about
legal recognition as a spouse to inherit from the deceased estate. For
example, in the cases of Motsoatsoa v Roro, Ndhlovu v Mokoena and
Mxiki v Mbata, what was at stake was the right to inherit the intestate
estates of the deceased. The application of official customary law,
without considering the issues at stake, therefore, leads to harsh
consequences for vulnerable parties, particularly women and children. 
119 Moropane v Southon (n 33 above) paras 39-40.
120 Moropane v Southon para 41.
121 Nthejane v Road Accident Fund (n 92 above).
122 See discussions by Ozoemena (n 12 above) 975 on the impact of law in
addressing social change.
123 Bhe (n 25 above) para 86.
COURTS AND CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES IN SOUTH AFRICA                                                              53
In acknowledging the adverse consequences due to the application
of official customary law, the Constitutional Court in Bhe observed
that124 
… magistrates and the courts responsible for the administration of intestate
estates continue to adhere to the rules of official customary law, with the
consequent anomalies and hardships as a result of changes which have
occurred in society. Examples of this are the manner in which the Bhe and
Shibi cases were dealt with by the respective magistrates. 
Therefore, as is evident from these cases, if the application of official
customary law will ‘lead to correctness of decision but consequently
to an injustice, nullity must [therefore] give way to an intended
validity’.125 Moreover, in cases such as Fanti v Boto where other
customary requirements have been met, particularly that of both
spouses having given consent, courts seem to be unfair to insist that
the non-fulfilment of only one requirement should lead to the
invalidity of a marriage.
5 Conclusion
The discussion of cases reveals that there is a disparity in addressing
the injustices of the past when official or living customary law is
applied in the context of customary marriages. Vulnerable parties are
protected where courts focus on the ‘essence’ of customary law and
apply living customary law.126 They are also protected where courts
develop living customary laws in line with the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights.127 Indeed, the Constitutional Court observed in
Mayelane v Ngwenyama:128
This Court has accepted that the Constitution’s recognition of customary
law as a legal system … requires innovation in determining its living
content as opposed to the potentially stultified version contained in …
legislation and court precedent.
However, as Bennett rightly points out, the challenge with this
preference for living customary law ‘is how this living law is to be
discovered and how it can be proved’.129 Indeed, in Mayelane the
Constitutional Court observed these challenges130 and cited with
approval the dictum in Bhe case that ‘the difficulty lies not so much in
the acceptance of the notion of “living” customary law but in
124 Bhe (n 25 above) para 87
125 Rautenbach & Du Plessis (n 42 above) 766.
126 See Mabuza v Mbata (n 2 above).
127 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above) para 43.
128 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above).
129 Bennett (n 13 above) 11. See also Kruuse & Sloth-Nielsen (n 38 above) 1717. 
130 In Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2 above) para 25, the Constitutional Court also
pointed out that ‘[p]aradoxically, the strength of customary law – its adaptive
inherent flexibility – is also a potential difficulty when it comes to its application
and enforcement in a court of law’.
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determining its content and testing it … against the provisions of the
Bill of Rights’. 
Despite the challenges, there is no doubt that the RCMA is an
attempt to address historical injustices to women. Therefore, it cannot
have unintended consequences for the women it seeks to protect.131
Moreover, courts have welcomed the RCMA as132
a belated but welcome and ambitious legislative effort to remedy the
historical humiliation and exclusion meted out to spouses in which
marriages were entered into accordance with the law and culture of the
indigenous African people of this country. 
This was recently reiterated in Maropane v Southon, that ‘[t]he primary
objective of the RCMA is to give customary marriages recognition
which was not the case under the past odious apartheid regime’.133 
In light of the above, courts must be sensitive to such issues and
develop official customary rules or apply living customary law in line
with the Constitution in order to protect the vulnerable parties. More
importantly, the choice is not only between applying living or official
customary law, but how courts develop these laws in line with the
Constitution.134 Indeed, in Mabuza v Mbatha ‘[t]he court held that
the test for the validity of indigenous law is … consistency with the
Constitution’.135 
131 Gumede v President of South Africa [2008] ZACC 23 paras 161-162.
132 Maropanee v Southon (n 33 above) para 44. See also Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 2
above) para 26.
133 As above.
134 Himonga & Bosch (n 13 above) 331 (my emphasis).
135 Mabuza v Mbata (n 2 above) para 32.
